Externalism, Visual Content, and Burge: Part 2
I claimed that whether Burge's strategy will succeed in the case of visual contents depends, remember, on whether experiences that P and the thoughts that might aspire to be knowledge of the contents of those experiences share contents as a matter of course.
I will argue that the Burge-style account cannot be extended to our knowledge of the content of our own experiences because (i) the representational resources utilized by experience and belief are different, (ii) the beliefs that accompany experience are not part of the experiences they accompany, and (iii) the beliefs that accompany experience are not about the experiences they accompany.
There is abundant reason to suspect that belief-forming mechanisms use representational resources that differ from those used by the visual system. Accordingly, if there is to be a justificatory account of our beliefs about our own experiences, it must be one that differs from Burge's.
A Red Herring: It is commonly claimed that experiences have non-conceptual contents. It is sometimes thought that this identifies a particular kind of content -- a kind of content that differs intrinsically from the contents of conceptual states. Perhaps one has in mind the view that propositional attitudes have contents that are composed of concepts -- whatever those are -- while experiences do not. If so, it follows that beliefs and experiences cannot have the same contents, since they take different sorts of things as objects. If so, it follows that Burge's maneuver cannot work. Since the experience that P cannot share contents with beliefs about it, these beliefs won't count as knowledge of the content of the experience since they do not share contents with the experience. Call this line of argument Red Herring. It turns out, however, that Red Herring is mistaken. Or, more carefully, the conception of the contents of experience Red Herring relies on is not justified by the standard arguments in favor of the existence of non-conceptual content.
The claim that experiences have non-conceptual contents should probably be understood as requiring only that a your experience can represent a feature even if you lack the conceptual resources to judge that things possesses that feature. It is possible for your experience to represent what you cannot. There is, in principle, no obstacle to someone's possession of the conceptual wherewithal to match his visual system's representational capacities. However, the fineness of grain and inexpressibility arguments used to establish the existence of non-conceptual content turn on there being actual differences between our conceptual resources and the representational capacity of our visual systems.
While Red Herring is no friend to someone who would seek to criticize the Burge strategies application to the case of visual content, we can now see how, if properly understood, the thesis that visual contents are non-conceptual poses a threat the Burge strategy.
In the best case for Burge's strategy, experiences and thoughts about them will share contents. But, even if experiences and thoughts about them share contents, their sharing those contents is not explained by the use of the same representational capacities. Thoughts deploy conceptual representational resources, while experiences do not. Since the representational capacities in virtue of which we believe and experience things differ, the relevant beliefs cannot be constituted as knowledge by the sharing of representational capacities. If they are constituted as knowledge, the explanation for their status must differ from the one Burge gives for judgments and our beliefs about our own judgments.
At any rate, remember, we are not the sort of creatures who can attribute in thought all of the properties our experience attributes to objects.
Let's set aside the challenge posed to a Burge-style account by non-conceptual contents for a moment. What if the contents of a subject's experience were such that they were thinkable by that subject? That is, what if there were a subject who could think what he experiences? What if, moreover, the relevant experiences and beliefs utilized the same representational resources. Even so there are functional differences between judgments and experiences that get in the way of a Burge-style account of our knowledge of the content of our own experience.
There are two problems for the Burge-style account here. First, the beliefs that accompany experience are not the right kind of beliefs to count as knowledge of the contents of the experiences they accompany. Second, the relation between the relevant experiences and beliefs is of the wrong sort.
I'll address this second point first. On Burge's account, we have certain kinds of knowledge of (at least some of) our own judgments because judgment-representing beliefs are part of these judgments. It is not simply that the judgments-representing beliefs share contents with and utilize the same representational resources as the judgments they represent. In addition to all that, the judgment-representing beliefs are part of the judgments they represent. And this fact explains their status as knowledge.
On Burge's account the relevant judgment that P always occasions the belief that I have judged that P. The reason for this is that the cases that Burge is giving an account of are cases of what he calls second-order reflexive judgments -- judgments that could be perspicuously expressed by sentences like "I am hereby thinking that water is wet." In such cases, the content of the judgment that P is "taken right up" by the second-order reflexive judgment.
(Such cases are probably the norm for judgment. The second-order belief needn't be tokened in a reflexive conscious judgment. You needn't assert inwardly "I hereby think that water is wet" in order for it to be true that the judgment that water is wet be accompanied by the belief that you have judged that P. Indeed, that a judgment counts as a judgment probably requires that it be accompanied by the belief. Judgments reflect a settling of the mind. In judgment, a temporary uncertainty is, at least for the time, resolved. Unless one believed that one had judged the matter, why would one feel settled?)
It is plausible that judgments occasion second-order beliefs and it is plausible that they do so in such a way that the second-order belief counts as knowledge. However, things are different with experience. The beliefs I form while I am experiencing are not part of the experience.
Consider now my worry that the beliefs that, in humans, accompany experience are of the wrong sort to constitute knowledge of the contents of those experiences. The beliefs that normally accompany judgment are judgment-representing beliefs. However, the beliefs that normally accompany experience are not experience-representing beliefs. Instead the beliefs that normally accompany experience are environment-representing beliefs. These beliefs are the ones of the sort we have when we "believe what we see". Thus the beliefs are formed as normal accompaniments to experience do not have the right subject-matter to count as knowledge of the contents of our own experiences.
The Burge-style account cannot be extended to our knowledge of the content of our own experiences because (i) the representational resources utilized by experience and belief are different, (ii) the beliefs that accompany experience are not part of the experiences they accompany, and (iii) the beliefs that accompany experience are not about the experiences they accompany.
I will argue that the Burge-style account cannot be extended to our knowledge of the content of our own experiences because (i) the representational resources utilized by experience and belief are different, (ii) the beliefs that accompany experience are not part of the experiences they accompany, and (iii) the beliefs that accompany experience are not about the experiences they accompany.
There is abundant reason to suspect that belief-forming mechanisms use representational resources that differ from those used by the visual system. Accordingly, if there is to be a justificatory account of our beliefs about our own experiences, it must be one that differs from Burge's.
A Red Herring: It is commonly claimed that experiences have non-conceptual contents. It is sometimes thought that this identifies a particular kind of content -- a kind of content that differs intrinsically from the contents of conceptual states. Perhaps one has in mind the view that propositional attitudes have contents that are composed of concepts -- whatever those are -- while experiences do not. If so, it follows that beliefs and experiences cannot have the same contents, since they take different sorts of things as objects. If so, it follows that Burge's maneuver cannot work. Since the experience that P cannot share contents with beliefs about it, these beliefs won't count as knowledge of the content of the experience since they do not share contents with the experience. Call this line of argument Red Herring. It turns out, however, that Red Herring is mistaken. Or, more carefully, the conception of the contents of experience Red Herring relies on is not justified by the standard arguments in favor of the existence of non-conceptual content.
The claim that experiences have non-conceptual contents should probably be understood as requiring only that a your experience can represent a feature even if you lack the conceptual resources to judge that things possesses that feature. It is possible for your experience to represent what you cannot. There is, in principle, no obstacle to someone's possession of the conceptual wherewithal to match his visual system's representational capacities. However, the fineness of grain and inexpressibility arguments used to establish the existence of non-conceptual content turn on there being actual differences between our conceptual resources and the representational capacity of our visual systems.
While Red Herring is no friend to someone who would seek to criticize the Burge strategies application to the case of visual content, we can now see how, if properly understood, the thesis that visual contents are non-conceptual poses a threat the Burge strategy.
In the best case for Burge's strategy, experiences and thoughts about them will share contents. But, even if experiences and thoughts about them share contents, their sharing those contents is not explained by the use of the same representational capacities. Thoughts deploy conceptual representational resources, while experiences do not. Since the representational capacities in virtue of which we believe and experience things differ, the relevant beliefs cannot be constituted as knowledge by the sharing of representational capacities. If they are constituted as knowledge, the explanation for their status must differ from the one Burge gives for judgments and our beliefs about our own judgments.
At any rate, remember, we are not the sort of creatures who can attribute in thought all of the properties our experience attributes to objects.
Let's set aside the challenge posed to a Burge-style account by non-conceptual contents for a moment. What if the contents of a subject's experience were such that they were thinkable by that subject? That is, what if there were a subject who could think what he experiences? What if, moreover, the relevant experiences and beliefs utilized the same representational resources. Even so there are functional differences between judgments and experiences that get in the way of a Burge-style account of our knowledge of the content of our own experience.
There are two problems for the Burge-style account here. First, the beliefs that accompany experience are not the right kind of beliefs to count as knowledge of the contents of the experiences they accompany. Second, the relation between the relevant experiences and beliefs is of the wrong sort.
I'll address this second point first. On Burge's account, we have certain kinds of knowledge of (at least some of) our own judgments because judgment-representing beliefs are part of these judgments. It is not simply that the judgments-representing beliefs share contents with and utilize the same representational resources as the judgments they represent. In addition to all that, the judgment-representing beliefs are part of the judgments they represent. And this fact explains their status as knowledge.
On Burge's account the relevant judgment that P always occasions the belief that I have judged that P. The reason for this is that the cases that Burge is giving an account of are cases of what he calls second-order reflexive judgments -- judgments that could be perspicuously expressed by sentences like "I am hereby thinking that water is wet." In such cases, the content of the judgment that P is "taken right up" by the second-order reflexive judgment.
(Such cases are probably the norm for judgment. The second-order belief needn't be tokened in a reflexive conscious judgment. You needn't assert inwardly "I hereby think that water is wet" in order for it to be true that the judgment that water is wet be accompanied by the belief that you have judged that P. Indeed, that a judgment counts as a judgment probably requires that it be accompanied by the belief. Judgments reflect a settling of the mind. In judgment, a temporary uncertainty is, at least for the time, resolved. Unless one believed that one had judged the matter, why would one feel settled?)
It is plausible that judgments occasion second-order beliefs and it is plausible that they do so in such a way that the second-order belief counts as knowledge. However, things are different with experience. The beliefs I form while I am experiencing are not part of the experience.
Consider now my worry that the beliefs that, in humans, accompany experience are of the wrong sort to constitute knowledge of the contents of those experiences. The beliefs that normally accompany judgment are judgment-representing beliefs. However, the beliefs that normally accompany experience are not experience-representing beliefs. Instead the beliefs that normally accompany experience are environment-representing beliefs. These beliefs are the ones of the sort we have when we "believe what we see". Thus the beliefs are formed as normal accompaniments to experience do not have the right subject-matter to count as knowledge of the contents of our own experiences.
The Burge-style account cannot be extended to our knowledge of the content of our own experiences because (i) the representational resources utilized by experience and belief are different, (ii) the beliefs that accompany experience are not part of the experiences they accompany, and (iii) the beliefs that accompany experience are not about the experiences they accompany.
posted by Idris at 6:22 PM
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