Grand Distinction #2
Frankfurt claims that the mere fact that one cares about a thing endows it with value. In The Contours of Agency he constantly harps on his critics for supposing that value must be constituted by subject-external facts. Presumably, however, he shouldn't deny that in some sense caring about a thing involves representing it as endowed with independent value. On the other hand, if caring is to create the values it (in some sense) represents then it needs to have intrinsic features which do not so represent. Otherwise, it would be opaque how such a state could create value. The theory that caring creates value really would be like the theory that true for me is a kind of truth. Since it seems that caring does create value, there must be more to caring than representing a thing as care-worthy.
Here we see another Grand Distinction in the philosophical tradition.
It is not contained to the case of value, of course. Consider response-dependence theories of color. On these theories to be colored C, is to be such as to provoke a kind of response in creatures like us (suitably idealized, under suitably idealized conditions). On such a theory it had better be the case that the response in terms of which the theory is given does not itself represent something as being colored C. On the other hand, presumably, it must be recognized that in some sense our visual system represents things as being colored C. At any rate, what we have here is a theory like Frankfurt's: a state which represents things as being some way (valuable, colored) gets its apt-ness by reference to some state of human responding which cannot -- on pain of circularity -- consist in representing things as bearing the property in question.
Skip the following paragraph if you're in a hurry.
OK, so there is some response to things that is supposed to endow those things with a property P. That response cannot simply consist in representing things as P. It is possible that the relevant response represents things as Q. In which case certain kinds of representational facts will ground the facts in light of which some representational contents are apt. So for example: maybe the color-fixing response of the ideal responder consists in representing things as visually similar (though in no specific way). That an ideal responder would respond in this way fixes the facts about color. Maybe my caring represents things as liked by me and it is in virtue of this fact that it creates facts about value.
But I'd like to set this aside for a moment. The alternative explanation is going to have to invoke something like qualia: intrinsic, non-intentional mental states.
So here is the Grand Distinction: Some theories postulate non-intentional states of people, which states, crucially, are partially constitutive of one's mental life -- and not in the way in which brain states are supposed to constitute one's mental life, but in a stronger way (like an occurrent belief partially constitutes one's mental life).
But there is a tradition of hostility to this kind of claim. I have to admit to being party to it. When possible see our mental lives as ways of taking things as being thus-and-so. When possible see our mental lives as basically content-driven.
Of course, there are bad reasons for allegiance to this tradition. For example: you might think that skeptical problems (or something like them) will be especially pressing if our mental lives are importantly constituted by non-intentional states. Intentional states launch our thinking at the world, non-intentional states would keep our thinking directed at itself. ...as if my thinking consisted in a stream of pretty pictures, none of which so much as purported to picture my local environment. This is all pretty silly. (Put the pieces together yourself.)
There are better reasons for allegiance, though. For example: try to isolate some feature of your conscious life that cannot be construed as a representation of the world one way or another. The sensations accompanying orgasm are sometimes supposed to be candidates for such states. But a literature exists suggesting (with some phenomenological plausibility, speaking for myself) that these sensations really represent various stirrings in the lower regions. A little good muscle tension here, a little better muscle tension there, etc. Have the qualia-freaks ever had an orgasm?!
Still... Frankfurt's position seems true. There does seem to be something right about the claim that caring about something makes it valuable in a way that it wasn't before. And if this claim can best be explained by reference to something qualia-like, then...
So a to do list:
1) Punch a certain Remy in the face -- thereby expressing only affection, of course.
2) See how the details of Frankfurt's position work out.
3) Consider theories that construe qualia-like features as really intentional.
4) Ask: what is the use of content such that one ought prefer accounts according to which the mark of the mental is intentionality?
5) Be sure there is a general split here. Do theories as diverse as Frankfurt's and the ideal response theory of color really fall into a philosophical kind?
6) Remember to eat and shower regularly.
Here we see another Grand Distinction in the philosophical tradition.
It is not contained to the case of value, of course. Consider response-dependence theories of color. On these theories to be colored C, is to be such as to provoke a kind of response in creatures like us (suitably idealized, under suitably idealized conditions). On such a theory it had better be the case that the response in terms of which the theory is given does not itself represent something as being colored C. On the other hand, presumably, it must be recognized that in some sense our visual system represents things as being colored C. At any rate, what we have here is a theory like Frankfurt's: a state which represents things as being some way (valuable, colored) gets its apt-ness by reference to some state of human responding which cannot -- on pain of circularity -- consist in representing things as bearing the property in question.
Skip the following paragraph if you're in a hurry.
OK, so there is some response to things that is supposed to endow those things with a property P. That response cannot simply consist in representing things as P. It is possible that the relevant response represents things as Q. In which case certain kinds of representational facts will ground the facts in light of which some representational contents are apt. So for example: maybe the color-fixing response of the ideal responder consists in representing things as visually similar (though in no specific way). That an ideal responder would respond in this way fixes the facts about color. Maybe my caring represents things as liked by me and it is in virtue of this fact that it creates facts about value.
But I'd like to set this aside for a moment. The alternative explanation is going to have to invoke something like qualia: intrinsic, non-intentional mental states.
So here is the Grand Distinction: Some theories postulate non-intentional states of people, which states, crucially, are partially constitutive of one's mental life -- and not in the way in which brain states are supposed to constitute one's mental life, but in a stronger way (like an occurrent belief partially constitutes one's mental life).
But there is a tradition of hostility to this kind of claim. I have to admit to being party to it. When possible see our mental lives as ways of taking things as being thus-and-so. When possible see our mental lives as basically content-driven.
Of course, there are bad reasons for allegiance to this tradition. For example: you might think that skeptical problems (or something like them) will be especially pressing if our mental lives are importantly constituted by non-intentional states. Intentional states launch our thinking at the world, non-intentional states would keep our thinking directed at itself. ...as if my thinking consisted in a stream of pretty pictures, none of which so much as purported to picture my local environment. This is all pretty silly. (Put the pieces together yourself.)
There are better reasons for allegiance, though. For example: try to isolate some feature of your conscious life that cannot be construed as a representation of the world one way or another. The sensations accompanying orgasm are sometimes supposed to be candidates for such states. But a literature exists suggesting (with some phenomenological plausibility, speaking for myself) that these sensations really represent various stirrings in the lower regions. A little good muscle tension here, a little better muscle tension there, etc. Have the qualia-freaks ever had an orgasm?!
Still... Frankfurt's position seems true. There does seem to be something right about the claim that caring about something makes it valuable in a way that it wasn't before. And if this claim can best be explained by reference to something qualia-like, then...
So a to do list:
1) Punch a certain Remy in the face -- thereby expressing only affection, of course.
2) See how the details of Frankfurt's position work out.
3) Consider theories that construe qualia-like features as really intentional.
4) Ask: what is the use of content such that one ought prefer accounts according to which the mark of the mental is intentionality?
5) Be sure there is a general split here. Do theories as diverse as Frankfurt's and the ideal response theory of color really fall into a philosophical kind?
6) Remember to eat and shower regularly.
posted by Idris at 4:56 PM
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