Willing, Sensing, and The Boundaries of The Self
Who am I? What constitutes the core of my life? I don't mean this to be a question about identity across time, but rather a question about the boundaries of my core (that which is most truly me) at a particular time.
There are two (interesting) kinds of answers to this, or so it strikes me, in the philosophical tradition. First, I am most essentially my willing self. Second, I am most essentially my sentient self. The boundaries of me are defined by the scope of my consciousness. If you wanted to list the events that constitute the history of my life -- whatever relation binds these events together into a single history rather than a series of histories -- you could give pride of place to my will and the things consequent upon it or you could give pride of place to the events constituting what it had been like to be me. Or: you could be forgiven for doing so, given your exposure to the philosophical tradition.
Consider moral theory.
The Kantian suggests that properly respecting the kinds of creatures we are requires responding to our volitional nature -- in the Kantian tradition this is understood to be our reason. That we are choosers is what drives morality. The utilitarian seems to suppose that properly respecting the kinds of creatures we are requires responding to our capacities for being conscious in various ways (by experiencing suffering or pleasure). That we are sentient is what drives morality, on this kind of theory.
I'd guess that moral theory is just one place where this pops up. The literature on the peculiarities of self-knowledge is pretty hairy, but it represents a similar divide. You might think that we have a mode of access to our own beliefs that is like our mode of access to our own actions. We know what we are about to do because we have made up our minds to do it. Likewise, we know what we believe (when we are believing occurrently) because we have made up our minds regarding how things are. On the other hand, you might suppose that we know what we believe (when we are believing occurrently) because we have special introspective access to some of our beliefs. We see ourselves believing, as it were. So what is going on there?
On any reasonable view, of course, there will be Interesting Relations between our willing and our sensory lives. First, let me note that it is not clear to what extent we should take these two understandings of the core as competitors. Moreover, there will be Interesting Relations between our core (whatever that is) and our periphery (which is nonetheless part of us). I have beliefs that are non-conscious, presumably. In virtue of what similarities to beliefs that are part of my core do these count as beliefs?
Also, I have said nothing about what giving pride of place to our willing nature might consist in. I have relied instead on our having a pre-theoretical grasp on this. But what, after all, is the interest of describing some feature of myself as constitutive of what is truly me?
I think there are Very Interesting Questions here. For example: how does our practice of belief fit in with this stuff? It might seem as if I can will arbitrarily. But my beliefs are not so unconstrained. This is plausibly both a contingent feature of my believing and a constitutive feature of my believing. On the other hand, there is, as we say, room for judgment in our beliefs. And we are held responsible for our beliefs in ways that seem to presuppose that our believing is will-governed. So how does doxastic activity relate to the core on the assumption that the core is will-constituted?
Interesting Question #2 (and one that doesn't seem much represented in the literature): Why are people (laymen) always going on about the conscious will? Is the will not essentially conscious? And if so, how does being conscious (aware) of what might have been an unconscious thing help anyone? "I am responsible for punching Remy in the face because I was aware of myself choosing it." (!!)
There are two (interesting) kinds of answers to this, or so it strikes me, in the philosophical tradition. First, I am most essentially my willing self. Second, I am most essentially my sentient self. The boundaries of me are defined by the scope of my consciousness. If you wanted to list the events that constitute the history of my life -- whatever relation binds these events together into a single history rather than a series of histories -- you could give pride of place to my will and the things consequent upon it or you could give pride of place to the events constituting what it had been like to be me. Or: you could be forgiven for doing so, given your exposure to the philosophical tradition.
Consider moral theory.
The Kantian suggests that properly respecting the kinds of creatures we are requires responding to our volitional nature -- in the Kantian tradition this is understood to be our reason. That we are choosers is what drives morality. The utilitarian seems to suppose that properly respecting the kinds of creatures we are requires responding to our capacities for being conscious in various ways (by experiencing suffering or pleasure). That we are sentient is what drives morality, on this kind of theory.
I'd guess that moral theory is just one place where this pops up. The literature on the peculiarities of self-knowledge is pretty hairy, but it represents a similar divide. You might think that we have a mode of access to our own beliefs that is like our mode of access to our own actions. We know what we are about to do because we have made up our minds to do it. Likewise, we know what we believe (when we are believing occurrently) because we have made up our minds regarding how things are. On the other hand, you might suppose that we know what we believe (when we are believing occurrently) because we have special introspective access to some of our beliefs. We see ourselves believing, as it were. So what is going on there?
On any reasonable view, of course, there will be Interesting Relations between our willing and our sensory lives. First, let me note that it is not clear to what extent we should take these two understandings of the core as competitors. Moreover, there will be Interesting Relations between our core (whatever that is) and our periphery (which is nonetheless part of us). I have beliefs that are non-conscious, presumably. In virtue of what similarities to beliefs that are part of my core do these count as beliefs?
Also, I have said nothing about what giving pride of place to our willing nature might consist in. I have relied instead on our having a pre-theoretical grasp on this. But what, after all, is the interest of describing some feature of myself as constitutive of what is truly me?
I think there are Very Interesting Questions here. For example: how does our practice of belief fit in with this stuff? It might seem as if I can will arbitrarily. But my beliefs are not so unconstrained. This is plausibly both a contingent feature of my believing and a constitutive feature of my believing. On the other hand, there is, as we say, room for judgment in our beliefs. And we are held responsible for our beliefs in ways that seem to presuppose that our believing is will-governed. So how does doxastic activity relate to the core on the assumption that the core is will-constituted?
Interesting Question #2 (and one that doesn't seem much represented in the literature): Why are people (laymen) always going on about the conscious will? Is the will not essentially conscious? And if so, how does being conscious (aware) of what might have been an unconscious thing help anyone? "I am responsible for punching Remy in the face because I was aware of myself choosing it." (!!)
posted by Idris at 3:18 PM
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