Deliberatin': Quasi-Enthymemetic Inference
This post will mainly respond to some of Pugsley's commentary on Skepticism about Deliberation, Part 1. I'll address one of his comments by filling in some detail about one of my worries about direct perceptual judgment.
Pugsley helpfully suggests that inference (as a psychological process) is a causal matter: "I don't see why the distinction [between mere sequence of thoughts and inferences] is different from the distinction between (a) a conjoined pair of events with no causation and (b) an earlier event causing a later event."
To infer is to have at least one thought cause at least one other thought. Call this the Pugsleyan theory.
[Before I start shooting, let me note that clearly something along these lines is right: inference -- understood here as a psychological happening -- is a causal matter. When I conclude that Q, based on some premises, it is causally because of my acceptance of the premises that I conclude that Q. If I hadn't accepted the premises I wouldn't have accepted the conclusion. If I didn't accept the premises, but came to, and then aimed to deduce based on them, I would accept the conclusion. It probably burns calories to infer. If God put a halt to causation, then despite my beginning with the premises I wouldn't continue to the conclusion. etc.]
I have some general, counter-example-y doubts about the Pugsleyan view, but I do not propose to dwell on them. Surely there must be some causal relations between thoughts that do not count as inferences. For example: my desire for cheese might cause me to think that I ought to call Grandma (she was a big fan of cheese, herself). Not an inference. But anyway...
If we accept the Pugsleyan view (strictu dictu), then we cannot maintain a distinction between direct perceptual judgment and inference-based perceptual judgment. Not (anyway) if the direct perceptual judgment is supposed to be formed without judgment. You'll have one state -- the experience -- and causation running from that to a judgment. This will count as an inference on the Pugsleyan account. And so direct perceptual judgment will turn out to be inferential after all.
It is possible that what people meant to focus on was a distinction between judgments based (whether this basing relation counts as inferential or not) on experience alone and judgments based on experience and other judgments or beliefs. Judgments formed on the basis of experience along (and not also on other judgments and beliefs) count as directly perceptual.
But now: note that in attributing inferences to ourselves we often suppose that we've made what I'll call quasi-enthymemetic inferences. Such inferences are enthymemetic in the sense that at the level of conscious thought they move from at least one premise to a conclusion, and yet do so in a way that fails to warrant the conclusion. They are quasi-enthymemetic because a non-occurrent (and hence non-conscious) belief actually functions as a premise -- actually pulls causal weight in whatever way premises do. In a sense, the premise was there all along. But, it seems, our mode of access to that part of our own mentality is theoretical, not introspective (or whatever).
You'll see what I mean by working through an example. Imagine: You think that P, you conclude that Q. You note that actually Q doesn't follow from P. You wonder what could I have been thinking? You note that you believe that R and that if R were cojoined with P, Q follows. (Also R is on the tip of your brain, so to speak.) So you attribute to yourself an quasi-enthymemetic inference: my belief that R must have played a premise-like role in getting me to think that Q.
Candidates for cases of directly perceptual judgments run the danger of also being cases of quasi-enthymemetic judgment. Where there are rational gaps there is reason to suppose that quasi-enthymemetic judgment has occurred. [We are finite creatures, of course, and so that is not always true: there are going to transitions we simply make, but I am prepared to argue that we are not yet at the bottom of rationalizing explanation].
If what you judge has the same content as your experience, then there will be no pressure to postulate a quasi-enthymemetic inference. But there is abundant reason to suppose that there are deep semantic differences between experiences and judgments. Judgments are conceptual, while experiences are not. Judgments are content-wise precise while experiences are not. (I can judge of one thing and a single property that it bears that property, while the same is not true of experience. Experience always represents a hugely open-ended plenitude of properties and a large number of individuals.) etc.
So there is abundant reason to think that transitions from experience to judgment are always semantic leaps. So there is abundant reason to suppose that transitions from experience to judgment are rational leaps.
Consideration of content aside, judgment is answerable to the whole of our beliefs, while experience isn't (because (i) it ain't agential and (ii) anyway it is immune to the authority of belief). So I am ready, when I judge on the basis of my experience, to reject my experience: to look again, more closely, to rub my eyes, etc. In the case of illusions, all I can do is refuse to believe. Anyway, this readiness to reject suggests two things: first, that the transition from experience to judgment is by itself a rational leap; second, that the transition from experience to judgment is plausibly subject to non-conscious monitoring. When I do judge on the basis of my experience it will be because I have accepted that, at least in this case, things are likely to be as they appear.
Summing up: since there is reason to suppose that transitions from experience to judgment are always risky, and anyway, always under the supervision of the tribune of our belief set, there is reason to suppose that these transitions are quasi-enthymemetic and so not formed on the basis of experience alone.
There is more to be said, of course. I have not addressed much of what Pugsley had to say and have, I am certain, created more problems for myself. But Sunday is short and the guilt of not dissertating is catching up.
Pugsley helpfully suggests that inference (as a psychological process) is a causal matter: "I don't see why the distinction [between mere sequence of thoughts and inferences] is different from the distinction between (a) a conjoined pair of events with no causation and (b) an earlier event causing a later event."
To infer is to have at least one thought cause at least one other thought. Call this the Pugsleyan theory.
[Before I start shooting, let me note that clearly something along these lines is right: inference -- understood here as a psychological happening -- is a causal matter. When I conclude that Q, based on some premises, it is causally because of my acceptance of the premises that I conclude that Q. If I hadn't accepted the premises I wouldn't have accepted the conclusion. If I didn't accept the premises, but came to, and then aimed to deduce based on them, I would accept the conclusion. It probably burns calories to infer. If God put a halt to causation, then despite my beginning with the premises I wouldn't continue to the conclusion. etc.]
I have some general, counter-example-y doubts about the Pugsleyan view, but I do not propose to dwell on them. Surely there must be some causal relations between thoughts that do not count as inferences. For example: my desire for cheese might cause me to think that I ought to call Grandma (she was a big fan of cheese, herself). Not an inference. But anyway...
If we accept the Pugsleyan view (strictu dictu), then we cannot maintain a distinction between direct perceptual judgment and inference-based perceptual judgment. Not (anyway) if the direct perceptual judgment is supposed to be formed without judgment. You'll have one state -- the experience -- and causation running from that to a judgment. This will count as an inference on the Pugsleyan account. And so direct perceptual judgment will turn out to be inferential after all.
It is possible that what people meant to focus on was a distinction between judgments based (whether this basing relation counts as inferential or not) on experience alone and judgments based on experience and other judgments or beliefs. Judgments formed on the basis of experience along (and not also on other judgments and beliefs) count as directly perceptual.
But now: note that in attributing inferences to ourselves we often suppose that we've made what I'll call quasi-enthymemetic inferences. Such inferences are enthymemetic in the sense that at the level of conscious thought they move from at least one premise to a conclusion, and yet do so in a way that fails to warrant the conclusion. They are quasi-enthymemetic because a non-occurrent (and hence non-conscious) belief actually functions as a premise -- actually pulls causal weight in whatever way premises do. In a sense, the premise was there all along. But, it seems, our mode of access to that part of our own mentality is theoretical, not introspective (or whatever).
You'll see what I mean by working through an example. Imagine: You think that P, you conclude that Q. You note that actually Q doesn't follow from P. You wonder what could I have been thinking? You note that you believe that R and that if R were cojoined with P, Q follows. (Also R is on the tip of your brain, so to speak.) So you attribute to yourself an quasi-enthymemetic inference: my belief that R must have played a premise-like role in getting me to think that Q.
Candidates for cases of directly perceptual judgments run the danger of also being cases of quasi-enthymemetic judgment. Where there are rational gaps there is reason to suppose that quasi-enthymemetic judgment has occurred. [We are finite creatures, of course, and so that is not always true: there are going to transitions we simply make, but I am prepared to argue that we are not yet at the bottom of rationalizing explanation].
If what you judge has the same content as your experience, then there will be no pressure to postulate a quasi-enthymemetic inference. But there is abundant reason to suppose that there are deep semantic differences between experiences and judgments. Judgments are conceptual, while experiences are not. Judgments are content-wise precise while experiences are not. (I can judge of one thing and a single property that it bears that property, while the same is not true of experience. Experience always represents a hugely open-ended plenitude of properties and a large number of individuals.) etc.
So there is abundant reason to think that transitions from experience to judgment are always semantic leaps. So there is abundant reason to suppose that transitions from experience to judgment are rational leaps.
Consideration of content aside, judgment is answerable to the whole of our beliefs, while experience isn't (because (i) it ain't agential and (ii) anyway it is immune to the authority of belief). So I am ready, when I judge on the basis of my experience, to reject my experience: to look again, more closely, to rub my eyes, etc. In the case of illusions, all I can do is refuse to believe. Anyway, this readiness to reject suggests two things: first, that the transition from experience to judgment is by itself a rational leap; second, that the transition from experience to judgment is plausibly subject to non-conscious monitoring. When I do judge on the basis of my experience it will be because I have accepted that, at least in this case, things are likely to be as they appear.
Summing up: since there is reason to suppose that transitions from experience to judgment are always risky, and anyway, always under the supervision of the tribune of our belief set, there is reason to suppose that these transitions are quasi-enthymemetic and so not formed on the basis of experience alone.
There is more to be said, of course. I have not addressed much of what Pugsley had to say and have, I am certain, created more problems for myself. But Sunday is short and the guilt of not dissertating is catching up.
posted by Idris at 3:09 PM
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