The Hughes Program
I've been putting together a list of what I take to be particularly irritating -- i.e. deep, central, hard -- problems for philosophers. These are problems for everyone in our field. Naturally finding these issues puzzling requires being somehow dissatisfied with the current theories... if there are such. At any rate, there is a cluster of related topics here and if the answers should turn out a particular way, then philosophy is doomed. The issues are one's I've thought need addressing, but have lacked the courage to do so.
1) How is knowledge of moral and modal facts possible?
More of the same: How is knowledge of mathematics possible?
2) What is the use of invoking abstracta in explanations -- numbers, contents, rules, properties, events, etc.?
3) How is subjectivism (projectivism, ideal observer theory, etc.) regarding some topic, different from straight error theory regarding that topic?
[I just made up the term "subjectivism"... but it ought to be fairly clear what it means (even if hard to define) -- viz. there are facts re: some topic, but those facts are constituted by our responses, or dispositions to respond, or something along those lines.]
Why don't the considerations that subjectivists use against non-subjectivist realism imply error theory rather than subjectivism?
4) What is the use of intuitions -- except as a tool for elucidating the facts about our own psychology? I take it that we could ask a similar question about conceivability arguments [If P is conceivable, then P is possible. And: if P is inconceivable, then P is impossible.], probably
motivated by similar concerns.
If you can cook up satisfactory answers to these questions, I'll bear your children... or give doing so serious thought. These questions are as yet a bit un-refined, so obviously I'd like to work on refining them. If you cannot answer them, then no children from me; but if you help me refine them or otherwise enhance the list, then you will win special merit in the eyes of God.
1) How is knowledge of moral and modal facts possible?
More of the same: How is knowledge of mathematics possible?
2) What is the use of invoking abstracta in explanations -- numbers, contents, rules, properties, events, etc.?
3) How is subjectivism (projectivism, ideal observer theory, etc.) regarding some topic, different from straight error theory regarding that topic?
[I just made up the term "subjectivism"... but it ought to be fairly clear what it means (even if hard to define) -- viz. there are facts re: some topic, but those facts are constituted by our responses, or dispositions to respond, or something along those lines.]
Why don't the considerations that subjectivists use against non-subjectivist realism imply error theory rather than subjectivism?
4) What is the use of intuitions -- except as a tool for elucidating the facts about our own psychology? I take it that we could ask a similar question about conceivability arguments [If P is conceivable, then P is possible. And: if P is inconceivable, then P is impossible.], probably
motivated by similar concerns.
If you can cook up satisfactory answers to these questions, I'll bear your children... or give doing so serious thought. These questions are as yet a bit un-refined, so obviously I'd like to work on refining them. If you cannot answer them, then no children from me; but if you help me refine them or otherwise enhance the list, then you will win special merit in the eyes of God.
posted by Idris at 6:03 PM
1 Comments:
The answer to (3) is obvious. Really, after n years at the University of Michigan, you should feel some shame now. ;)
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