Dissertation: Analysis as a (Crap) Method
The axe hanging above my head has become especially vivid of late. And so I am resolved to blog on topics relating to my dissertation. Never fear, dear reader (that would be me, as far as I can tell), I'll begin by tying the topic into some of the preoccupations of this blog as it has proceeded thusfar.
Here is the question that began my dissertation efforts: what is it to visually perceive (see) a given particular (rather than nothing at all or something else). The standard view is something like this: to visually perceive a thing is to be subject to an internal state (call it a visual experience) and for this internal state to depend in the right way (probably by being caused by the perceived thing in the right way) on the perceived thing. Thus, giving a thorough theory of visual perception requires two things: giving an account of visual experience and getting straight about the dependence relation.
There are two deep problems with this whole damn project, as far as I can tell. First, determining the right kind of dependence is difficult. Not merely difficult, but maybe essentially incompletable. The experience must depend in the right kind of way on its object. It seems that you can always say more about what this right way is -- it requires causation, for example. But it is not sufficient that the experience be caused by its object. It is further required that the experience be caused by its object in the right way. Maybe in addition it has to be caused in such a way as to counterfactually depend on some range of ways the object could be. But this is not enough: the counterfactual dependence has to be the right kind of counterfactual dependence. Sigh... It seems that the theory is essentially incompletable. If that is the case, I don't know what this means. Does it mean that there cannot be an interesting philosophical theory of perception?
The second problem is especially metaphilosophical. The standard methodology works like this: You provide an initial theory -- based on a consideration of paradigm cases of visual perception. Next, you consider the inevitable counterexamples (where these are revealed by intuition). Now try to accommodate them by refining your analysis. Repeat. (So we have the first problem. There is inductive evidence that the repetition will be endless. And this is upsetting because it is boring. The iterations don't seem to provide any special philosophical pay-off.) The problem with the methodology, other than what seems to be its essential endlessness, is that I do not have confidence that it can be expected to reveal the truth about seeing.
The worry here is that the method seems best suited to merely revealing the our (my?) conception of seeing. Call the project of revealing such a conception the psychological project. But my stance -- qua metaphysician -- is that this is not an interesting question. I want to know what seeing is, not how I/we think about seeing. Moreover, supposing that my project really is (surprise, surprise) the psychological project, it is a problem that the terms of the analysis are theoretically sophisticated terms. If our goal is to reveal our (that includes you Grandma!) conception of the facts, and our conception is limited by the concepts we possess, then it really ought to be illegitimate to give an analysis in terms like counterfactual dependence or possible worlds. Grandma don't know from counterfactual dependence and so you might think that her conception of seeing don't involve any such exotica.
I guess this is the same old post-Quinean problem. And yet many of us philosophers seem to follow a practice that looks like the psychological project. Is there a compelling solution to worries like mine that everyone but me got the memo on?
Here is the question that began my dissertation efforts: what is it to visually perceive (see) a given particular (rather than nothing at all or something else). The standard view is something like this: to visually perceive a thing is to be subject to an internal state (call it a visual experience) and for this internal state to depend in the right way (probably by being caused by the perceived thing in the right way) on the perceived thing. Thus, giving a thorough theory of visual perception requires two things: giving an account of visual experience and getting straight about the dependence relation.
There are two deep problems with this whole damn project, as far as I can tell. First, determining the right kind of dependence is difficult. Not merely difficult, but maybe essentially incompletable. The experience must depend in the right kind of way on its object. It seems that you can always say more about what this right way is -- it requires causation, for example. But it is not sufficient that the experience be caused by its object. It is further required that the experience be caused by its object in the right way. Maybe in addition it has to be caused in such a way as to counterfactually depend on some range of ways the object could be. But this is not enough: the counterfactual dependence has to be the right kind of counterfactual dependence. Sigh... It seems that the theory is essentially incompletable. If that is the case, I don't know what this means. Does it mean that there cannot be an interesting philosophical theory of perception?
The second problem is especially metaphilosophical. The standard methodology works like this: You provide an initial theory -- based on a consideration of paradigm cases of visual perception. Next, you consider the inevitable counterexamples (where these are revealed by intuition). Now try to accommodate them by refining your analysis. Repeat. (So we have the first problem. There is inductive evidence that the repetition will be endless. And this is upsetting because it is boring. The iterations don't seem to provide any special philosophical pay-off.) The problem with the methodology, other than what seems to be its essential endlessness, is that I do not have confidence that it can be expected to reveal the truth about seeing.
The worry here is that the method seems best suited to merely revealing the our (my?) conception of seeing. Call the project of revealing such a conception the psychological project. But my stance -- qua metaphysician -- is that this is not an interesting question. I want to know what seeing is, not how I/we think about seeing. Moreover, supposing that my project really is (surprise, surprise) the psychological project, it is a problem that the terms of the analysis are theoretically sophisticated terms. If our goal is to reveal our (that includes you Grandma!) conception of the facts, and our conception is limited by the concepts we possess, then it really ought to be illegitimate to give an analysis in terms like counterfactual dependence or possible worlds. Grandma don't know from counterfactual dependence and so you might think that her conception of seeing don't involve any such exotica.
I guess this is the same old post-Quinean problem. And yet many of us philosophers seem to follow a practice that looks like the psychological project. Is there a compelling solution to worries like mine that everyone but me got the memo on?
posted by Idris at 2:45 PM
3 Comments:
Wow, you write a lot. I haven't had time to read any of your posts yet because I was in Jamaica up until about six hours ago. But I will become one of ... I will become your reader.
Some responses to this post:
(1) You wrote, "The worry here is that the method seems best suited to merely revealing the our (my?) conception of seeing. Call the project of revealing such a conception the psychological project. But my stance -- qua metaphysician -- is that this is not an interesting question. I want to know what seeing is, not how I/we think about seeing." There is surely a difference between x and one's concept of x; so far, so good. But *knowing* what's just our conception of x as opposed to what x is seems just about impossible. Naively, it seems to me that we have to use our concepts to grasp the world, so it seems really hard to separate the psychological project from the metaphysical project (unless by "psychological project" you mean something like "folk conceptions of perception", in which case you could point out problems with the folk conceptions and then present a better conception of your own).
(2) You wrote: "Moreover, supposing that my project really is (surprise, surprise) the psychological project, it is a problem that the terms of the analysis are theoretically sophisticated terms. If our goal is to reveal our (that includes you Grandma!) conception of the facts, and our conception is limited by the concepts we possess, then it really ought to be illegitimate to give an analysis in terms like counterfactual dependence or possible worlds." You can say what someone is committed to in theoretically sophisticated terms, and be correct about that, without thereby claiming that the person thinks *in those terms*. For instance, a person might say, "oh, there's a pickle", and thereby commit themselves to the existence of persisting, material objects.
(3) There's surely something interesting there about theories being incompletable. I don't know what it is, but you shouldn't drop that thought.
Well, it would be good to have some help if you feel that you’re lost with thesis writing. And from the looks of it, you certainly need some thesis help back then. So, what happen to your thesis? I hope everything went well with everything.
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