God and The Authority of Morality
In his article, "A Short Introduction to Kantian Ethics", David Velleman reports a Kantian argument for the conclusion that the authority of our moral obligations cannot derive from their being instituted by God. I am dubious.
Velleman writes:
According to Kant, the force of moral requirements does not even depend on the authority of God. There is a simple argument for denying this dependence. If we were subject to moral requirements because they were imposed on us by God, the reason would have to be that we are subject to a requirement to do what God requires of us; and the force of this latter requirement, of obedience to God, could not itself depend on God's authority. (To require obedience to God on the grounds that God requires it would be viciously circular.) The requirement to obey God's requirements would therefore have to constitute a fundamental duty, on which all other duties depended; and so God's authority would not account for the force of our duties, after all.
Idris Responds:
According to Kant, if it were true that the authority of morality derived from God's creative act, then there would have to be a requirement that we do what God commands, and only because of this requirement would the particular commandments of God – refrain from lying, take care of your children – apply to us. Kant then causes trouble by asking where the authority of this requirement comes from. Kant is portrayed as supposing that a general requirement to do as God commands is prior to the particular requirements of morality. It is prior in the sense that the authority of the particular requirements of morality derives from it.
However, I don’t see why anyone would be committed to the idea that it is only because of a general requirement to do as God commands that God’s creation of particular moral requirements succeeds. God’s particular commands could have basic authority. Question: Why avoid stealing? Answer: Because God has ruled out stealing (and this is the end of the story). Thus Kant’s supposition that God’s particular commands have authority over us only if there is a general requirement to do as God commands seems to be gratuitous. If so, we needn’t conclude that there is one requirement that has authority over us independent of God’s making it authoritative. Kant needs to give us an argument that God’s creation of morality must involve a general requirement to do as God requires.
I suspect that part of the dispute will come down to questions about what sorts of requirements might turn out to be basic requirements (requirements deriving their authority from no other requirements).
Velleman writes:
According to Kant, the force of moral requirements does not even depend on the authority of God. There is a simple argument for denying this dependence. If we were subject to moral requirements because they were imposed on us by God, the reason would have to be that we are subject to a requirement to do what God requires of us; and the force of this latter requirement, of obedience to God, could not itself depend on God's authority. (To require obedience to God on the grounds that God requires it would be viciously circular.) The requirement to obey God's requirements would therefore have to constitute a fundamental duty, on which all other duties depended; and so God's authority would not account for the force of our duties, after all.
Idris Responds:
According to Kant, if it were true that the authority of morality derived from God's creative act, then there would have to be a requirement that we do what God commands, and only because of this requirement would the particular commandments of God – refrain from lying, take care of your children – apply to us. Kant then causes trouble by asking where the authority of this requirement comes from. Kant is portrayed as supposing that a general requirement to do as God commands is prior to the particular requirements of morality. It is prior in the sense that the authority of the particular requirements of morality derives from it.
However, I don’t see why anyone would be committed to the idea that it is only because of a general requirement to do as God commands that God’s creation of particular moral requirements succeeds. God’s particular commands could have basic authority. Question: Why avoid stealing? Answer: Because God has ruled out stealing (and this is the end of the story). Thus Kant’s supposition that God’s particular commands have authority over us only if there is a general requirement to do as God commands seems to be gratuitous. If so, we needn’t conclude that there is one requirement that has authority over us independent of God’s making it authoritative. Kant needs to give us an argument that God’s creation of morality must involve a general requirement to do as God requires.
I suspect that part of the dispute will come down to questions about what sorts of requirements might turn out to be basic requirements (requirements deriving their authority from no other requirements).
posted by Idris at 11:33 AM
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