The Possibility of Metaphysics
It seems to me that there are two paths to metaphysics. Each of them begins with the possibility of a kind of gap between knowing that some set of beliefs is true and having a kind of understanding of the way things are.
Sense and Truth-Making
One can know something without knowing what makes it true. Of course, God might appear to me and inform me that blablabah is true. Sadly, I do not understand his language and so -- even though I have some grip on the truth -- my epistemic position is less than perfect. But even if I am in a position to grasp the thought expressed by a sentence, I might desire to know more... and metaphysical reflection might well be supposed to help me.
Consider the predicament of Louise Lane. Her problem is not like my problem with God's unintelligible testimony. When someone tells her that Superman is in the City, she can grasp that thought. She often, indeed, wishes he was around more often. Moreover, if someone tells her that Clark Kent is in the City, she can grasp that thought, as well.
So, she might know that Superman is in the City and that Clark Kent is in the City. But, her picture of the world is incomplete. There is more she might reasonably aspire to know. She might know a great deal and yet -- because of the phenomena that motivates Frege's Puzzle -- not know what makes her thoughts true. She doesn't know that Kal-El and his location is what makes her thoughts true.
One wonders how complete a true picture of reality might be and still allow for ignorance about that which makes this picture true. Assuming leeway on this, perhaps one job of the metaphysician is to provide a picture of the underlying reality in virtue of which our thoughts are true.
The Great Chain of Constitution
Fred: Are there numbers?
Mike: Yes; there is, for example, one natural number between 3 and 1.
Fred: Great... so I guess we should become Platonists...
Mike: Well no... numerical facts obtain because [insert some story about sets or something]
Fred: So I guess you're saying that there is a kind of explanation, by which we show how some domain of (less basic) facts is grounded in some other domain of (more basic) facts.
Mike: Yes! I call it the 'Great Chain of Constitution'.
Fred: Awesome!
Mike: Totes.
Fred: I think I have some minimal understanding of causal explanations... I wonder, though, what this non-causal, constitutive explanation might come down to.
Fred: Me too... but if there is a hierarchy of constitution relations, which get picked out by true constitutive explanations, then I maybe I get to be a metaphysician.
Sense and Truth-Making
One can know something without knowing what makes it true. Of course, God might appear to me and inform me that blablabah is true. Sadly, I do not understand his language and so -- even though I have some grip on the truth -- my epistemic position is less than perfect. But even if I am in a position to grasp the thought expressed by a sentence, I might desire to know more... and metaphysical reflection might well be supposed to help me.
Consider the predicament of Louise Lane. Her problem is not like my problem with God's unintelligible testimony. When someone tells her that Superman is in the City, she can grasp that thought. She often, indeed, wishes he was around more often. Moreover, if someone tells her that Clark Kent is in the City, she can grasp that thought, as well.
So, she might know that Superman is in the City and that Clark Kent is in the City. But, her picture of the world is incomplete. There is more she might reasonably aspire to know. She might know a great deal and yet -- because of the phenomena that motivates Frege's Puzzle -- not know what makes her thoughts true. She doesn't know that Kal-El and his location is what makes her thoughts true.
One wonders how complete a true picture of reality might be and still allow for ignorance about that which makes this picture true. Assuming leeway on this, perhaps one job of the metaphysician is to provide a picture of the underlying reality in virtue of which our thoughts are true.
The Great Chain of Constitution
Fred: Are there numbers?
Mike: Yes; there is, for example, one natural number between 3 and 1.
Fred: Great... so I guess we should become Platonists...
Mike: Well no... numerical facts obtain because [insert some story about sets or something]
Fred: So I guess you're saying that there is a kind of explanation, by which we show how some domain of (less basic) facts is grounded in some other domain of (more basic) facts.
Mike: Yes! I call it the 'Great Chain of Constitution'.
Fred: Awesome!
Mike: Totes.
Fred: I think I have some minimal understanding of causal explanations... I wonder, though, what this non-causal, constitutive explanation might come down to.
Fred: Me too... but if there is a hierarchy of constitution relations, which get picked out by true constitutive explanations, then I maybe I get to be a metaphysician.
posted by Idris at 4:31 PM
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